Business Review
Article 4

Volume 3 Issue 1
January-June 2008

1-1-2008

Institution of bureaucracy and the conflict in South Asia
Huma Baqai
Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Baqai, H. (2008). Institution of bureaucracy and the conflict in South Asia. Business Review, 3(1), 23-32.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1130

This article is brought to you by iRepository for open access under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
and is available at https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol3/iss1/4. For more information, please contact
irepository@iba.edu.pk.

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol3/iss1/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1130

Business Review – Volume 3 Number 1

January – June 2008

ARTICLE

Institution of Bureaucracy and
The Conflict in South Asia
Huma Baqai
Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan

T

he role of bureaucracies is vitally important in the conflict-cooperation balance.
Bureaucrates by definition are implementers of policy. This implementation also
sometimes graduates to initiation of policies; therefore, it would be appropriate to
say that although they are implementers, they also perform a variety of other
functions which enhances their role and importance in the functions of the states,
particularly bureaucratic states.
Max Weber, the earliest proponent of bureaucratic behavior, applauded the
bureaucratic mode of political organization as the most advanced and the best form
suited to the administration of complex societies. To him, the bureaucratic mode was
a clear advance on its predecessors. However, the model is not in practice anywhere.
No bureaucracy in the world functions according to the laid down principles, and
therefore, what Weber saw as virtues became vices in the eyes of later observers.
What was referred to as predictable and regularized, the critics found it to be
restrictive. Rules to provide regularized channels had become ends in themselves and
not means to other goals. Injecting fresh approaches became difficult because elected
leaders could not break the stranglehold that bureaucracies had on policy. The
marshaling of expertise to solve difficult problems became a cover for bureaucrats to
serve the interest of their own organizations, at the expense of the public and other
bureaucracies with which they competed for resources and influence. What for
Weber had been the pinnacle of modern political organization had become the
logjam in the machinery of government to successor observers.
The factor of permanence associated with the institution of bureaucracy also has
relevance to this discourse. Bureaucracies by being the permanent element of the
state should have been the most rational component of the government. With politics
and politicians being transitionary, do not deal with issues over a stretched period of
time. It is the bureaucrats who are the permanent custodians of the nation’s goals and
aspirations. The bureaucracy, thus is the system which is responsible for assisting the
elected representative of the governments for a fair and faithful dealing of public and
private transactions. At the same time, rivalries, interdepartmental hostilities, and
divisions are common to all the bureaucracies of the world. The competition and the
risk of policy failures causing embarrassment, discourage the taking of bold
initiatives, or for that matter even supporting them. The infamous red tapism is also
a bureaucratic norm. All of this results in conservatism and routine decision making.
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Bureaucratic behaviors do have an impact on foreign policy decisions of the state. It
influences particularly in countries and regions where hostilities exist have been
observed. For example in the subcontinent, apparently for bureaucracies, security
emanates from the status quo and not change. They continue to be essential both to
the domestic and foreign policies
BUREAUCRACIES IN SOUTH ASIA
The institutions of bureaucracy have an important role in the polity of South Asia.
The governments of South Asia are highly bureaucratic, almost linear, and lacking
constructive pluralism. The colonial mindset and the legacy of civil service seem to
linger on even after sixty years of independent existence.
The bureaucracy in the subcontinent is also called Civil Service. One of the earliest
demands of the Indian nationalist opinion was to rationalize the structure and
function of civil service, to provide a greater share to Indians in the administration of
their country. This desirability of civil service of being supportive of the basic goals
was transformed into their necessity of being committed to the government of the
day. Thus, services were politicized and corrupted right from the onset, partly
because the leadership desired it, and partly because the service themselves sought
illegitimate favors from the politicians. There was gradual decline in quality,
efficiency, and integrity of services even at the higher level. Civil service careers,
promotions and postings, job security, all became part of the system of distribution
of spoil and patronage.
Another facet is the excessive bureaucracy which is again a colonial legacy. Within
the colonial structures, policies were formulated by colonial leaders, and
subsequently implemented by civil servants (bureaucrats). However, after
independence, bureaucrats performed both roles despite their relative inexperience in
leadership. This continues and as a result, the role of policy makers and leaders are
not distinct, and are fulfilled by inexperienced bureaucrats. Their role hence is taken
to be of immense importance in the conflict- cooperation equation in inter-state
relations.
Indian bureaucracy became politicized partly because the political elite desired it,
and partly because the services themselves sought illegitimate favors from the
politicians. Due to this, the political neutrality norms of the services suffered
grievous erosion. The 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments brought in India (in
the name of empowering people and decentralizing power) resulted in more
centralization and bureaucratization of power because of the constitutional
safeguards. Even after almost sixty years of independence, the bureaucrats have not
learnt the simple truth of their being citizens first, and only then officers. They are
servants and not masters of the people, thus their job is to serve the people, not rule
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over them. Multilevel and multifaceted corruption and red tapism are two major
attributes of Indian bureaucracy. Lack of accountability and patronage of corrupt
politicians and greedy businessmen have made the Indian bureaucracy a law unto
itself. Bureaucrats have created such a steel frame around themselves that even the
might of the state can’t dismantle it. Decline in quality, efficiency, and integrity of
the bureaucracy in concert with constitutional safeguards has given the Indian
bureaucracy a formidable stature.
Role of the Indian bureaucracy in conflict and cooperation has been controversial
with procedural stringency being a norm. The politicization of it has impacted
India’s relation with all its neighbors, be it Pakistan, Bangladesh or Nepal.
Bureaucracies seem comfortable with the status quo, and resist and oppose change.
Unfortunately the Indian bureaucratic mindset and approach towards policy making
and issues of governance and conflict resolution emerges as a major impediment in
its desire for a prominent role in international affairs. This is propelling India
towards revamping its policy of confrontation and coercive diplomacy in the region.
There is increasing realization in the Indian leadership and think tanks that
bureaucratic inefficiency has to be tackled by downsizing the bureaucracy and also
by envisaging regulatory rules for the remaining one. However, this particular focus
is for the domestic role of the bureaucracy, or maybe the bureaucratic delays caused
on the economic front where foreign investors complain about Indian persistence
with unnecessary regulations.
National security debates in India have also been impaired by the generalist nature of
the Indian bureaucracy. The bureaucracy suffers from the tradition of Vikramaditya
throne, whereby wisdom and expertise are not acquired through dedication and toil,
but are embedded in the chair a person occupies. The conceptual reality of this is that
permanent bureaucracy becomes too career-oriented to offer rational policy options
to the changing leadership. The bureaucracy because of its limited vision and
expertise is unable to demonstrate any imagination so essential to develop the new
thinking in the conflict-cooperation balance of the region. The religious zealots,
extreme nationalists, and masses continue to mistrust the bureaucracy and have no
confidence in them to protect vital national interests. The bureaucracy on the whole
is viewed as a corrupt institution.
Since early 1920s, Jawahar lal Nehru remained the undisputed architect, articulator,
and practitioner of Indian foreign policy. His virtual monopoly over Indian foreign
policy decisions not only lasted for over 40 years, but continues to dominate even
after his death in 1964. On the domestic front, he did face opposition but never on
his stance on external relations. None of his colleagues, contemporaries, or critics
had any inclination to seriously confront his foreign policy. In the words of Stephen
Cohen, “Even though Nehru encouraged debates on foreign policy issues, few
politically strong figures could challenge him on the floor of the Parliament--- Nehru
was a one-man policy, planning staff and coordinator, as well as the source of major
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initiatives that put India on the world’s diplomatic map----there was no need for
institutional development in foreign policy when Nehru combined both expertise and
political power.”11 Even the Sino-India debacle did not erode his diplomatic space,
and he completely dominated the foreign and security policies with limited
consultations with his colleague and subordinates. The dual role as India’s foreign
minister eroded any room for consensus building. This Nahruvian tradition
continued for a long time and foreign policy has remained the exclusive prerogative
of the prime minister who often doubles as the minister of external affairs as P.V
Narasimhma Rao, I.K. Gujral and Atal Behari Vajpayee.
Another important tendency which over the years has contributed to the
centralization of decision making with the prime minister is the working of the prime
minister with a small group of advisers, though the decision-making is supposed to
be the joint responsibility of the prime minister and his cabinet. The handpicked
group of advisors alone was a part of and privy to the sensitive strategic decisions
taken by prime minister, later formally endorsed by the cabinet. Since they were
answerable and accountable only to the prime minister, their advice and suggestion
tended to circumvent normal democratic institutions as well as parliamentary
oversight. Indra Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi continued with this practice. Vajpayee
was also known for independent on the spur foreign policy decisions. J.N. Dixit in
his memoirs, talks about how Foreign Minister Narishma Rao was not favorable to
the idea of Indo-Sri Lanka accord of 1997. He made three points about the whole
process of negotiations. First, India should not rush into this agreement. Second, it
should carefully consider the wisdom of being direct signatories to this agreement.
He was of the view that Sri Lankan Tamils should sign the agreement with Sri
Lankan government and we should just be guarantors. Third, he suggested that India
must very carefully assess whether the willingness of the LTTE and Sri Lankan
government to come to an agreement was based on a genuine desire for peace and a
durable settlement, and not just an interim tactical move. Suggestions of the then
Foreign Minster were totally ignored and Rajiv Gandhi went ahead with the
controversial accord.
Sensitive national decisions, especially in the nuclear arena, were also confined to
the prime minister, with the rest of the political leadership, the armed forces, and the
bureaucracy remaining completely out of the process. The Foreign Ministry had no
knowledge of Indian weaponisation program and was not informed about the goal of
India acquiring a full balanced nuclear deterrence capability. The two examples
definitely point towards a tradition of bypassing institutions, as well as towards
institutional inadequacy in India. The institution of bureaucracy falls short both on
the domestic and foreign policy front. The Indian bureaucracy on the whole is
subordinate to the office of the Prime Minister, especially in matters of national
security. It, however, does perform the usual role of a bureaucracy in a bureaucratic
polity, where in routine decision-makings; focus on status quo is maintained and any
innovative thinking or bold initiatives for conflict resolution are prevented.
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In Pakistan, bureaucracies agitate more controversies than any other component of
the ruling establishment. The tradition of a strong centralized administration and an
efficient framework of services, a legacy of the British, could have been an asset for
the newly born state. Unfortunately, it became politicized immediately because of
the constant interference by politicians and the military. The bureaucratic-militaryelite are at the core of Pakistan’s power configuration. The military and bureaucracy
are the principle institutions. Their elites are relatively small, cohesive, share similar
political attitudes, and enjoy institutional bases of power. After independence, a new
era began in which the role of the bureaucracy expanded rapidly, both horizontally
and vertically. In place of law and order, development became the new buzzword. To
undertake the development work of a newly formed country, the concept of statutory
bodies came into existence. Laws were made to establish specialized bodies with
specific objects with a great degree of autonomy, so they may function
unencumbered with red tape. This changed the power and role of the bureaucracy
radically; however, its traditional mindset was not altered at all.
Bureaucratic attitudes became redundant to contemporary needs in two ways. First,
the primary orientation was not altered from serving the masters to serving the
masses. Second, Indian civil services were performance oriented; in that their
primary role was to execute authority and justice on the beaten track. The
institutional decay set in, which depicts itself by virtue of being heavily politicized
and unable to provide basic public service, because the bureaucracy is fully aware
that the political superiors are dependant on it for policy advice and administration,
which is the key for their own political sustenance.
The shift in the institutional balance of power in Pakistan in favor of the military and
bureaucracy is interplay of domestic, regional and international, factors. They
include the institution of strong central government, problem of asserting authority
over provinces, and most critically, the defense imperative of a state besieged by
external and internal threats, especially the initiation of hostilities with India over
Kashmir. This allowed military-bureaucracy nexus deliberately and systematically
weakening the political process by exploiting the rivalries among politicians on one
hand, and manipulating their connection with the centers of the international system
in London and Washington.16 Pakistan even bartered away its autonomy in foreign
affairs to serve the interests of the military bureaucratic oligarchy.
The Pakistan’s polity emerges as a textbook case of bureaucratic authoritarianism. The
prevalence of this approach in the polity of Pakistan can be gauged by the following:
• Postponing the distribution of resources or even reversing it in order to
foster economic growth. The Ayub Khan’s one unit and more recently the
controversy and conflict over the allocation of NFC Awards, water
distribution and storage (Kalabagh Dam) are examples of it.
• The desire to create a more efficient, internationally competitive economy
and cultivating international economic actors, partners in the development

27

Published by iRepository, February 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol3/iss1/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1130

Business Review – Volume 3 Number 1

•

January – June 2008

model. In the past, policies followed by General Ayub Khan which created
the dominance of twenty-two families in Pakistan followed this pattern.
Pakistan’s continues with this dependence on international monetary
agencies (IMF, World Bank and the Asia Development Bank). The
macroeconomic reforms introduced at the behest of these agencies are not
always people-centric and inclusive.
Attempts to control or destroy movements which would undermine or resist
such policies. Bureaucratic authoritarianism thus gets translated into a form
of bureaucratic and technocratic military rule that seeks to curtail popular
mobilization, and is built on political coalitions and policy orientation that
entails strong ties to international economic actors. It is a form of modern
rather than traditional authoritarianism and has a major bureaucratic
dimension.

After practically sixty years of Pakistan’s existence, civil and military bureaucracies
have had a very important role in the making and implementation of policies, both
foreign and domestic. From devising development strategies to preparing fiscal and
monetary policies, waging wars, keeping conflicts alive, negotiating foreign
assistance, all has been done by senior bureaucrats. Politicians have occasionally
barged in, but the impact has been very limited because of implementation
constraints. The implementation is the prerogative of the bureaucrats. In Pakistan,
the civil and military bureaucracy have always taken all major decisions. The chart
below would gives details of the institutional balance in Pakistan
Power Balance in Pakistan
Time
Period

Democratic
Governments

Bureaucracy

1951-58

In name

Real Power

1958-69



Supporting
Partner

1969-71



Real Power

1971-77

Real Power

Downsized

1977-88



1988-99

Competitive
Democracy

1999-01



2001-to
date

In name
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The security debate and perceptions in Pakistan become more understandable
because of the military-bureaucracy nexus. The unilateral focus on external threats
and the India-centric security paradigm actually serves the purpose of this elite
group. The gradual increase in internal security problems, because of these linear
security perceptions, does not get impressed upon the policy makers of Pakistan. It is
actually grounded in a strong tradition of the bureaucratic-organizational imperative.
The world view of Pakistan is just divided between states that strengthen Pakistan
against India and those who do not. Such a classification is convenient from the
standpoint of the civil-military bureaucracy that has control over policy-making. The
existence of a continued and formidable threat allows policy makers to get away with
a simple security plan. This particular skew in policy making provides greater room
for sustaining bureaucratic organizational interests, since military security is given
precedence over every other agenda. As a result like any post colonial bureaucratic
state structure, Pakistan defined security in tangible terms. More specifically, it is
defined as an ability to stave-off a military threat from India. Due to the weak
political process in Pakistan, the bureaucracy emerges as a major player in the
conflict-cooperation equation in the region. The nexus between the military and
bureaucracy makes it even more formidable, promoting patterns of conflict rather
than cooperation in inter-state relations.
Sri Lanka also inherited a strong framework of civil service at independence. Its
composition and nature, however, kept changing. Its merit and political neutrality
was compromised because of the ethnicity based civil war in Sri Lanka. The political
class in Sri Lanka assumed dominance over the bureaucracy, particularly because of
a functioning parliamentary democracy. Nonetheless, politicization of services led to
several evils including corruption in administration, overstaffing, and inefficiency.
Parliamentary constituencies became more like the fiefdoms of parliamentarians. In
effect the role of the civil services in Sri Lanka stands undermined.
In Nepal there is largely uninstitutionalized competition for power. The bureaucracy
or civil service hardly exists. The policy making in Nepal suffered because of a total
absence of political institutions controlling the bureaucracy. The mechanism of
parliamentary control did not grow fast enough and, therefore, the old practices of
subservience, unquestioning obedience, sycophancy and personal service continued.
The 1990 Constitution thus confers the professional civil service commitment to the
principle of bureaucratic neutrality, recruitment by competition on merit, and
promotion on grounds of efficiency and seniority has not really evolved.
In Bhutan, there is a policy of self imposed isolation because of its claustrophobic
geographical position where larger, richer, stronger, and occasionally antagonistic
neighbors have made external relations crucial not only to its survival as an
independent state, but also its internal politics. Like any other buffer state, Bhutan
has sought security by pursuing a policy of withdrawal from the surrounding world.
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The rigid postures and maximilist position adopted by the bureaucrats and the
politicians of the region have been the bane of cooperation. It often serves the
purpose of the political leadership under pressure from various lobbies to let the
bureaucrats assume a harsher posture, while maintaining their own mild and friendly
tone. This tactic is a mark of India-Pakistan relations. This confuses people, provides
sustenance to hawks, and causes despair to those interested in peace. For cooperation
to happen in the region there is a need for bold initiatives and out of box solutions.
The courage to propose and do what has not happened so far. The bureaucracies of
the region will have to fall in line. Rampant corruption, which the bureaucracy is a
part and parcel can only be eliminated if more transparency, access to information,
and accountability is introduced. The protection mechanisms are also to be
abolished. Since the violence in South Asia is structural and the bureaucracies are a
part of this violence, South Asia call for a radical change to do away structural
violence both at inter and intra-state levels.
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“The only person over whom you have direct and immediate control is your self.
The most important ossets to develop, preserve, and enhance, therefore, are your
capabilities. And no one can do it for you. You must cultivate the habits of
leadership effectiveness yourself and doing so will be the single best investment
you’ll ever make”
STEPHEN R. COVEY
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